The study of economic behavior of service providers in a competition environment is an important and interesting research issue. A two-server service network has been proposed in Kalai et al. [10] for this purpose. Their model aims at studying the role and impact of service capacity in capturing larger market share so as to maximize the long-run expected profit. A Markovian queueing system of two servers is used in their model and analysis. They formulate the problem as a two-person strategic game and analyze the equilibrium solutions. The main aim of this paper is to extend the results of the two-server queueing model to the case of a general multiple-server queueing model. Here we will focus on the case when the queueing system is stable.
Introduction
The problem of finding the optimal strategy and control policy of a queueing system is a traditional mathematical problem and has been well studied in the literature, see for instance [2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16] . In an optimal control problem, it usually involves making decisions on system parameters such as the system service capacity and number of servers in the system under a specified cost structure (convex or concave). Here service capacity is an important competitive factor in the design of a system, for example, in the areas of telecommunication networks [6] , data transmission systems [10] and Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) system [3, 15] . In particular, the current development in supply chain management emphasizes the coordination and integration of inventory and transportation logistics [4, 17] . VMI is a supply chain initiative where the distributor is responsible for all decisions regarding the selection of retailers or agents. This creates a competitive environment for the agents and retailers to compete in the market [13] .
Regarding the service capacity, Kalai et al. [10] studied a strategic game of two servers competing for their market shares through determining their service capacities. A Markovian queueing system of two servers is used in their model and analysis. Markovian queueing systems are popular tools for modeling service systems as they are mathematically tractable [6, 7] when compared to non-Markovian queueing systems. The problem is then analyzed using game theory [14] . Game theory is a popular and promising approach [1, 5] for the captured problem. They classified the Nash equilibria into three different cases concerning the cost function and the revenue per customer. The waiting time is finite in one of these cases and there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. Although their model is simple, it brings in two important concepts. The first one is the "competitive game of servers" and the second one is the "market share of a server in a multi-server facility". Furthermore, they also report that when the marginal cost of providing service is "high", there is a unique symmetric equilibrium and the total service capacity is less than the mean demand rate. In such a case, each server actually behaves as if it were a monopolist. Competition therefore has no effect and this leads to an undesirable situation. On the other hand, when the marginal cost of providing service is "low", a unique symmetric equilibrium exists and the total service capacity is greater than the mean demand rate.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we will give a brief review on the two-server queueing system discussed in [10] . We present the general multiple-server queueing model and our analysis on the system performance in Section 3. Finally concluding remarks are given to address further research issues in Section 4.
A Review on the Two-Server Queueing Model
The service system studied by Kalai et al. [10] consists of two independently operated servers. Customers arrive according to a Poisson process of rate λ and the service times are assumed to follow the exponential distribution. Each of the server i operates independently and determines its own service capacity µ i so as to maximize its own profit. The cost to operate at service capacity µ is c(µ). Here the operating cost function c(.) is assumed to be an increasing and strictly convex function, i.e., both c ′ (µ) and c ′′ (µ) are positive and an example of such a function is c(µ) = µ 2 .
The servers earn a fixed amount R for each unit of service rendered. The queueing system consists of a single First-In-First-Out queue. If a customer arrives when both servers are idle, he/she is assigned to either server with equal likelihood. No server is allowed to be idle when at least one customer in the system. If a customer arrives when one server is idle and the other is busy, he/she will be assigned to the idle server. In the followings, we give a brief review on the queueing models discussed in [10] .
The System Steady-state Probability Distribution
If Server i (i = 1, 2) chooses service capacity µ i and such that
the system has a steady-state probability distribution. We remark that condition (1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for an Markovian queueing system to be stable or to have steady-state probability distribution. Let P n be the probability that there are n customers in the system; P 10 be the probability that Server 1 is busy and Server 2 is idle; P 01 be the probability that Server 2 is busy and Server 1 is idle. By studying the balanced equations of the queueing system, the following results are obtained:
and
where
is the system load. Moreover, one also has
The Market Share
Computing the market share of Server i is equivalent to computing the mean number of customers per time unit that enter service with Server i. Using the results in Section 2.1.1, if µ 1 + µ 2 > λ, then the mean number of customers per time unit that enter service with Server 1 is P 0 λ 2 + P 01 λ + P 3 µ 1 + P 4 µ 1 + . . .
and that with Server 2 is
We then divide these two expressions by the mean number of customers per time unit that enter service, i.e., λ, to obtain the market share of Server i. Thus the fraction of all customers served by Server i(i = 1, 2), is given by
The Profit Function
Given the market shares of the servers in Section 2.1.2, the profit function π i (µ 1 , µ 2 ) of Server i ∈ {1, 2}, the expected profit per time unit earned by Server i, is then given by
Here c(µ) is the cost per time unit of providing service at capacity µ and R is the revenue that the server earns for each customer served.
The Equilibrium
Kalai et al. [10] considered the situation as a two-person strategic game and found that finite waiting times exist at equilibrium if and only if
Moreover, if this condition is satisfied, then a unique equilibrium exists in which both servers select the same service capacity µ c = µ 1 = µ 2 , such that
3 The General Multiple-server Queueing System
In this section, we extend the two-server queueing system studied in [10] to a n-server queueing system. The arrival process of customers is assumed to be a Poisson process. In this queueing system, arriving customers wait in a single First-In-First-Out (FIFO) queue if all servers are busy. No server is allowed to be idle when there is at least one customer in the queueing system. If a customer arrives when more than one server is idle, the customer is assigned to any of the idle servers with equal likelihood. Once a server completes the service of a customer, the first customer in the queue, if any, is assigned to the server. Each server i may choose its own service capacity µ i , and its service time follows the exponential distribution with mean 1/µ i . The servers earn a revenue of R for each customer served, and each of them incurs a cost of c(µ) to operate at service capacity µ.
In the following subsections, we present some important properties of the multipleserver queueing system through the propositions. The proofs of the propositions can be found in the Appendix.
The Steady-state Probability Distribution of the Queueing System
Given the service capacities µ 1 , . . . , µ n and the mean demand rate λ, suppose
This condition is to guarantee that the queueing system is stable and the system steadystate probability distribution exists. We would like to obtain the steady-state probability distribution of the number of customers in the system. Let us give the following definitions. Let P i be the steady-state probability of having i customers in the system, where i = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Also let P s , where s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) and s i = 0 or 1, be the steady-state probability of having s i customers at Server i. We note that by definition
We establish the balanced equations governing the steady-state probability distribution. The equations can be obtained by equating the incoming rate and outgoing rate at each of the state. For s i = 0, 1 and
where (s −i , s
gives
For the states with at least n customers we have
We note that these two equations together are equivalent to
We also have the normalization equation
It can be shown by direct verification that the solution is given by Proposition 1. We have
The steady-state probability distribution describes the long-run behavior of the system. Each of these probabilities P k represents the long-run proportion of time that there are k customers in the system. They are essential in studying how each server determines its strategy to maximize its long-run profit. In the next subsection, we will write the market share of each server in terms of these probabilities and obtain an expression for the market share.
The Market Share
We derive the market share of each server from the steady-state distribution. We note that when n j=1 µ j ≤ λ, i.e., customers arrive at least as fast as the servers can serve them. the steady-state probability distribution does not exist and the queue is infinite. In this case, each server receives customers at its service capacity in the long run. Otherwise, n j=1 µ j > λ and all customers will be served. Each server only receives a fraction of the arriving customers, at a rate lower than its service capacity. The server's profit is thus affected by the fraction of all customers it serves, i.e. its market share.
When k(1 ≤ k ≤ n) servers are idle, customers arrive at a rate of λ and an arriving customer is served by any one of the k idle servers with equal likelihood. Each of these idle servers therefore receives customers at a rate of λ/k. On the other hand, when all servers are busy with at least one customer waiting in the system, each of the busy servers i receives a new customer when it completes the service for a customer, i.e. at a rate of its service capacity µ i .
To obtain the market share, we find the expected value of the server's rate of receiving customers in different states of the systems, taking expectation over the steady-state probabilities. In the following, we give the formula for the market share for an individual server.
We note that when µ i → ∞, we have the market share of Server i
. . , n tends to the following limit
As we focus on the case when the mean demand rate is less than the total service rate, the market share is directly tied to the profit of a server. Before formulating the profit function of a server, we state the following two propositions related to the partial derivatives of the market share α i with respect to µ i . These will be useful in determining the Nash equilibrium of the system when we considered the system as a n-player strategic game.
Furthermore, when µ i → ∞, we have
Propositions 3 and 4 together mean that the market share α i is increasing and concave with respect to µ i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
The Profit Function
Here we proceed to find out the profit function of an individual server, which represents the server's profit per time unit in the long run. There are two cases to be considered. When
Server i receives customer at a rate of µ i . In both cases, Server i incurs a cost of c(µ i ). Therefore, the profit function of Server i takes a similar form as that in [10] and is given by
Each of the servers aims to maximize its long-run profit when determining its service capacity. Therefore, how a server's profit changes with its service capacity (when other servers' capacities remain unchanged) is important in characterizing the server's decision. By proposition 3 and 4, we readily obtain the following proposition describing the properties of the profit function π i with respect to µ i . Proposition 5. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, for each fixed λ > 0 and µ j > 0 for j = i, the function π i (µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ n ) is continuous and strictly concave in µ i .
The continuity and concavity of the profit function ensure that the first-order condition is a sufficient condition for a value of µ i to maximize the profit function.
The Nash Equilibrium of the Queueing System
Since servers' decisions of their service capacities would affect the profit of each other, we model the situation as an n-player strategic game, in which each server i simultaneously chooses its service capacity µ i to maximize its profit π i . Here we discuss the Nash equilibrium of the system. In the two-server model in [10] , a unique symmetric equilibrium is found in the case when the total demand rate is less than the total service rate. In our analysis, we will show that, similar to the two-server case, when the marginal cost is low enough, there is a unique equilibrium, in which all servers choose the same service capacities. In the following, we will first look at how the profit of Server i changes with its service capacity when all other servers choose the same service capacities.
It should be noted that proposition 6 implies that for
we have
We also note that the partial derivative in proposition 6 gives the marginal benefit Server i gets by unilaterally deviating from a service capacity µ c commonly chosen by all servers.
The following proposition gives the Nash equilibrium of the game, which represents the decision of the servers on their service capacities in the long run.
′ (λ/n) then there is a unique equilibrium where
and µ c is the unique solution that satisfies µ c > λ/n and
i.e.,
If (n − 1)R/n ≤ c ′ (λ/n) then the system has no equilibrium in which the expected waiting time is finite.
We note that from the proposition, we have µ c > λ/n and so the expected waiting times are finite. This means that we know that if the marginal cost of serving 1/n of all customers is less than (n − 1)/n of the revenue received per customer, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with finite waiting times.
For equation (30) to hold, it means that the marginal benefit Server i gets by unilaterally deviating from a service capacity µ c commonly chosen by all servers must be equal to the marginal cost to do so. In this case, Server i does not benefit from changing its service capacity. Mathematically, the first-order condition for π i holds. From the concavity of π i obtained in proposition 5, we know that choosing µ c as the service capacity maximizes the profit for Server i.
Since the servers share the same cost function and the same profit function with respect to their own service capacities, the condition for which the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost is identical for all servers when they choose the same service capacities. The proposition asserts that there is only one value of µ c which satisfies the condition, and that this symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the system. This proposition shows that, given the arrival rate of customer λ, the number of servers n and the revenue per customer R, all servers will choose the same service capacity given by equation (31) in the long run if the condition
is satisfied. The proposition is useful for determining the minimum value of revenue per customer R for which the system will have a finite-waiting time equilibrium. When n = 2, Propositions 6 and 7 reduce to the results in [10] . It is worth noting that as n increases, (n − 1)R/n increases and c ′ (λ/n) decreases. Therefore, the minimum value of R required for the existence of a finite waiting-time equilibrium decreases as n increases. An increase in the number of servers causes competition to become more intense. Thus the minimum revenue per customer needed to achieve an equilibrium with finite waiting times becomes lower.
A Numerical Example on Three-Server Queueing System
In this subsection, we present a numerical example for a three-server service system, i.e., n = 3. Here we assume the cost function takes the following form:
and the condition for the queueing system to be stable holds, i.e.
We note that c ′ (µ) > 0 and c ′′ (µ) > 0 for µ > 0. So c(µ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
We first give the steady-state probability distribution of the system. The following result comes from Proposition 1 in Section 3.1.1. We have
,
Moreover, we have
where j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i, j, l are distinct. Now we have
.
i.e., R > λ then there is a symmetric equilibrium where µ 1 = µ 2 = µ 3 = µ c and µ c is the unique solution that satisfies 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we extend the analytical results of the two-server queueing model in [10] to the case of a general multiple-server queueing model. To extend our study to the incentive aspect of the queue system is our future work.
A service system of two servers coordinated by one central agency was studied by Gilbert and Weng [11] . The principal-agent relationship [12] between the central agency and the servers was studied, from the principal's perspective. It is of interest whether the allocation policy with a separate queue or that with a common queue would allow the coordinator to control waiting times at a lower cost. Again customers arrive according to a Poisson process and the service times are assumed follow an exponential distribution. Each of the server operates independently and determine their own service capacities so as to maximize their individual profits. The coordinating agency determine a fixed amount R to compensate the servers per unit of service rendered. The coordinating agency then has to determine the minimum value of R needed to maintain expected system time below a given level.
It was found that the servers have a weaker incentives to increase their service capacities in common queue systems than in separate queue systems. They conclude that in some cases, the competition incentive effects can more than offset the risk-pooling benefits of a common queue. In these cases the separate queue allocation scheme then has advantages over common queue allocation scheme. In particular, cases with small permissible waiting times or not severe diseconomies on increasing capacity favor the separate queue system. The queueing system discussed here corresponds to the common queue allocation policy with N servers. Therefore the results obtained here are ready to apply to generalize the models and conclusions addressed in [11] . We will extend the model in [11] by allowing the number of servers to be more than two.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
We note that
We will then verify that this solution satisfies (14) and (17) .
Recall that Equation (14) we have for s i = 0, 1 and
So the left-hand-side is
The right-hand-side is
which equals the left-hand-side. For Equation (17) 
Note that
Therefore the right-hand-side is
which is equal to the left-hand-side. When k > n, the left-hand-side is
And the right-hand-side is
which is equal to the left-hand-side. The expression of P 0 can be readily obtained from the normalization equation substituting the above expressions.
Proof of Proposition 2
The mean number of jobs per time unit that enter service with Server i is given by
λP s |{j|s j = 0}| + µ i (P n+1 + P n+2 + . . .)
The market share of Server i is
Q i is the mean number of jobs per time unit that enter service with any server. Thus the market share of Server i is
Proof of Proposition 3
We consider the partial derivative of α i (λ, µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) with respect to µ i . Here we assume that λ and µ j (j = i) are given and fixed, and write α i (µ i ) for short. Let
We also note that both C i and D i are positive, and are constant with respect to µ i . Now we have
Then we have
We observe that
Thus we have λD
Combining the two cases, we have
since the numerator approaches a constant
and the denominator approaches +∞.
Proof of Proposition 4
and we have
Since the denominator B(µ i ) 3 > 0, we have α
In the following, we will prove that
Before proceeding, we need the following result:
for j =i µ j < λ and µ j > 0 for j = i for some given λ > 0. The equality holds when µ j = µ k for all j, k = i.
To prove this, we first consider the problem
for some given M > 0. Using the Lagrangian method, we have at the maximum,
The first equation gives µ j = µ k for all j = i, k = i. Then the second equation gives
We check that µ j > 0 for all j = i.
The maximum of the objective function is therefore
Since this is true for any M > 0, thus it is true for any values of µ j 's such that µ j > 0 for j = i. Hence we have inequality (36). Now we will show that
and so G i (µ i ) is a quadratic function of µ i with the minimum point attained at
Here we note that 6[λD i − (λ − j =i µ j )C i ] > 0 as we obtained earlier, and
where the inequality follows from (36). Now let γ = j =i µ j λ , we have 0 < γ < 1.
Thus we have
and so µ min,i < λ − j =i µ j . Since G i (.) is a quadratic function with minimum at µ min,i ,
where γ = j =i µ j λ and 0 < γ < 1
Therefore we have
Combining the two cases, we
Proof of Proposition 5
For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, for each fixed λ > 0 and µ j > 0 where j = i, Clearly π i (µ i ) is continuous for µ i < λ − j =i µ j , as well as for µ i > λ − j =i µ j . To show that π i (µ i ) is continuous at the point µ i = λ − j =i µ j , we note that, as µ i approaches λ − j =i µ j from above, π i (µ i ) approaches the following limit:
To prove the concavity of π i , first note that c(.) is convex and so −c(.) is concave. Also, it is proved in Proposition 4 that α i (µ i ) is concave in µ i . Therefore, it remains to prove that,
So π i (µ i ) is concave in µ i for µ i > 0. Therefore, the function π i (µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ n ) is continuous and strictly concave in µ i .
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose that µ 1 = µ 2 = . . . = µ n = µ c , we have
We then have
Substituting C i with the expression in (37), we obtain (27). 
n − i n = n. The left-hand-side of (39) is negative while the right-hand-side is positive, by the convexity of c(.). Therefore, equation (39) cannot be satisfied. If n j=1 µ j < λ, then there must exists i such that µ i < λ/n. For equilibrium we have
However,
Therefore, equation (40) cannot be satisfied. We conclude that there is no Nash equilibrium in which servers do not choose the same service capacities.
